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Abstract
Information systems have widely been the target of
malware attacks. Traditional signature-based ma-
licious program detection algorithms can only de-
tect known malware and are prone to evasion tech-
niques such as binary obfuscation, while behavior-
based approaches highly rely on the malware train-
ing samples and incur prohibitively high training
cost. To address the limitations of existing tech-
niques, we propose MatchGNet, a heterogeneous
Graph Matching Network model to learn the graph
representation and similarity metric simultaneously
based on the invariant graph modeling of the pro-
gram’s execution behaviors. We conduct a system-
atic evaluation of our model and show that it is ac-
curate in detecting malicious program behavior and
can help detect malware attacks with less false pos-
itives. MatchGNet outperforms the state-of-the-art
algorithms in malware detection by generating 50%
less false positives while keeping zero false nega-
tives.
1 Introduction
With information systems playing ubiquitous and indispens-
able roles in many modern industries including financial ser-
vices and retail businesses, cyber security undoubtedly bears
the utmost importance in the daily system management. Un-
der constant cyber-attacks happening every day, incidents
causing significant financial losses and leakage of sensitive
customer data appear in media headlines every now and then.
Among these attacks, malware/malicious program attacks are
the most widespread and costly type, and they are growing
fast to target at more companies and organizations. Accord-
ing to a study report published by Accenture1, 98% of the
participating companies experienced malware attacks in 2016
and 2017, and these attacks cost companies an average of $2.4
million. Symantec also finds that the number of groups using
destructive malware was up by 25% in 20182. With imminent
∗Work done during an internship at NEC Labs America.
†The first two authors contributed equally.
1www.accenture.com/us-en/insight-cost-of-cybercrime-2017
2www.symantec.com/security-center/threat-report
malware attacks, protecting key information systems has be-
come the top priority for many companies and organizations.
Malware/malicious program detection as the first line of
defense against attacks mainly uses two types of approaches:
signature-based and behavior-based. Signature-based ap-
proaches [Damodaran et al., 2017; David et al., 2017] check
program signatures against a known malware database. Such
signatures can be instruction sequences, system calls, loaded
dynamic libraries, and so on. While signature-based ap-
proaches are widely adopted by antivirus software due to their
time efficiency, they are mostly limited to detect known mal-
ware and prone to evasion techniques such as binary obfusca-
tion. Nowadays, such signature-based approaches are facing
difficulties from zero-day malware attacks, which are highly
polymorphic and rarely have known signatures [Damodaran
et al., 2017].
Behavior-based approaches [Rieck et al., 2008; Babic´ et
al., 2011; Jha et al., 2013; Bernardi et al., 2018; Saracino et
al., 2018] as an improvement over the signature-based ones
learn the program behaviors in terms of dependencies be-
tween system-elements (i.e., system-calls or API calls), and
classify a program to either the malicious or the benign cat-
egory using the learned model. The program behaviors cap-
tured by these approaches generally reflect real program in-
tentions, thereby complementing static signatures that can
easily be manipulated. On the other hand, behavior-based
approaches incur prohibitively high training cost. In order to
learn malicious program behavior, one must collect enough
malware samples, and then execute them repeatedly in a con-
trolled environment to observe their runtime behaviors. In-
sufficient sampling and observations of malicious behavior
can unavoidably limit the detection capability, and malware
attacks can also evolve via adversarial learning to evade de-
tection.
In contrast to those malware detection algorithms focusing
on detecting known malware, the goal of this paper is to de-
sign an effective data-driven approach for detecting unknown
malicious programs. We define a malicious program as a pro-
cess that is unknown to the execution environment and be-
haves differently to all existing benign programs. Slightly
more formally, given a target program with corresponding
process event data (e.g., a program opens a file or connects to
a server) during a time window, we perform similarity learn-
ing and check whether the behavior of the program is similar
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to that of any existing benign programs. If some highly simi-
lar programs exist, the model outputs top-k most similar pro-
grams with their IDs/names and similarity scores; otherwise,
it triggers an alert.
It is difficult to detect unknown malicious programs due
to four major challenges: (1) The nonlinear and hierarchical
heterogeneous relations/dependencies among system entities.
The operations made by programs have nonlinear and hierar-
chical heterogeneous dependencies, and they work together
in a highly complex and coordinated manner. Simple meth-
ods that neglect these dependencies may still yield high false
positive rates; (2) Lack of intrinsic distance/similarity met-
rics [Zhang et al., 2015] between two programs. Consider
that in real computer systems, given two programs with thou-
sands of system events related to them, it is a non-trivial task
to measure their distance/similarity based on the categorical
event data; (3) The exponentially large event space. An infor-
mation system typically deals with a large volume of system
event data (normally more than 10, 000 events per host per
second) [Dong et al., 2017]; (4) Aliases of programs. Dif-
ferent versions or updates of the same program have differ-
ent signatures and may also have different executable names.
Thus, a simple method that keeps a white-list of program
IDs/signatures could be problematic.
To address these challenges, we propose MatchGNet,
a data-driven graph matching framework to learn the pro-
gram representation and similarity metric via Graph Neu-
ral Network. In particular, we first design an invari-
ant graph modeling to capture the heterogeneous interac-
tions/dependencies between different pairs of system entities.
To learn the program representation from the constructed het-
erogeneous invariant graph, we propose a hierarchical atten-
tional graph neural encoder. Finally, we propose a similar-
ity learning model via Siamese Network to train the parame-
ters and perform similarity scoring between an unknown pro-
gram and the existing benign programs. MatchGNet trains
the model on existing benign programs, not on any mal-
ware/malicious program samples. As a result, it can identify
an unknown malicious program whose behavioral representa-
tion is significantly different to any of the existing benign pro-
grams by similarity matching. We conduct an extensive set of
experiments on real-world system provenance data to evalu-
ate the performance of our model. The results demonstrate
that MatchGNet can accurately detect malicious programs.
In particular, it can detect fake and unknown programs with
an average accuracy of 97% and 96%, respectively. We also
apply MatchGNet to detect realistic malware attacks. The
results show that it can reduce false positives of the state-of-
the-art by 50%, while keeping zero false negative.
2 Motivating Example and Related Work
In a phishing email attack as shown in Figure 1, to steal sen-
sitive data from the database of a computer/server, the adver-
sary exploits a known venerability of Microsoft Office3 by
sending a phishing email attached with a malicious .doc file
to one of the IT staff of the enterprise. When the IT staff
member opens the attached .doc file through the browser, a
3https:// nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0081
Figure 1: An example of phishing email attack.
piece of malicious macro is triggered. This malicious macro
creates and executes a malware executable, which pretends to
be an open source Java runtime (Java.exe). This malware then
opens a backdoor to the adversary, subsequently allowing the
adversary to read and dump data from the target database via
the affected computer.
Figure 2: Malicious Java.exe vs. normal Java runtime.
Signature-based or behavior-based malware detection ap-
proaches generally do not work well in detecting the mali-
cious program in our example. As the adversary can make
the malicious program from scratch with binary obfuscation,
signature-based approaches [David et al., 2017; Bernardi et
al., 2018] would fail due to the lack of known malicious
signatures. Behavior-based approaches [Babic´ et al., 2011;
Jha et al., 2013; Bernardi et al., 2018] may not be effective
either, unless the malware sample has previously been used
to train the detection model.
It might be possible to detect the malicious program us-
ing existing host-level anomaly detection techniques [Lin et
al., 2012; Jyothsna and Prasad, 2011; Chen et al., 2016;
Cao et al., 2018]. These host-based anomaly detection meth-
ods can locally extract patterns from process events as the
discriminators of abnormal behavior. However, such detec-
tion is based on observations of single operations, and it
sacrifices the false positive rate to detect the malicious pro-
gram [Lin et al., 2018]. For example, the host-level anomaly
detection can detect the fake “Java.exe” by capturing the
database read. However, a Java-based SQL client may also
exhibit the same operation. If we simply detect the database
read, we may also classify normal Java-based SQL clients
as abnormal program instances and generate false positives.
In the enterprise environment, too many false positives can
lead to the alert fatigue problem [Harang and Kott, 2017;
Lin et al., 2018], causing cyber-analysts to fail to catch up
with attacks.
To accurately separate the database read of the malicious
Java from the real Java instances, we need to consider the
higher semantic-level context of the two Java instances. As
shown in Figure 2, the malicious Java is a very simple pro-
gram and directly accesses the database. On the contrary, a
real Java instance has to load a set of .DLL files in addition
to the database read. By comparing the context of the fake
Java instance, we can find that it is not normal and precisely
report it as a malicious program instance. Thus, in this paper,
we propose a Graph Neural Network based approach to learn
the semantic-level context of program instances.
In recent years, Graph Neural Network (GNN) ap-
proaches [Defferrard et al., 2016; Hamilton et al., 2017;
Velickovic et al., 2017; Kipf and Welling, 2016; Gilmer et al.,
2017; Wu et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019b; Ying et al., 2018;
Chen et al., 2018] have been proposed for graph-structured
data. They try to accelerate convolution operations, reduce
the computational cost, and extend the current graph convo-
lution. The goal of GNN is to learn the representation of the
graph, in the node level or graph level. Because of its remark-
able graph representation learning ability, GNN has been ex-
plored in various real-world applications, such as healthcare
[Mao et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2017], chemistry [Fout et al.,
2017; Zitnik et al., 2018], and security system [Wang et al.,
2019a].
In parallel to the Graph Neural Network, graph similarity
matching has been studied extensively in the machine learn-
ing community [Yan et al., 2004; Shasha et al., 2002; Willett
et al., 1998; Raymond et al., 2002]. The similarity metric can
be categorized into two types: exact matching (isomorphism
test) [Yan et al., 2004; Shasha et al., 2002] and structure sim-
ilarity measures (graph edit distance) [Willett et al., 1998;
Raymond et al., 2002]. Besides, in the computer vision com-
munity, learning-based metrics [Weinberger and Saul, 2009;
Sun et al., 2014] are proposed to match the image data. They
compute the similarity score with either hand-engineered
features or hand-designed metrics. Compared to these ap-
proaches, our work is different in two folds: 1) we focus on
learning from the heterogeneous graph, rather than the homo-
geneous graph; and 2) we learn the graph representation and
similarity metric simultaneously.
3 Heterogeneous Graph Matching Networks
3.1 Overview
To address the challenges introduced in Section 1, we pro-
pose a heterogeneous Graph Matching Network framework,
MatchGNet, with three key modules: Invariant Graph Mod-
eling (IGM or Step (A)), Hierarchical Attentional Graph
Neural Encoder (HAGNE or Step (B)), and Similarity Learn-
ing (SL or Step (C)) as illustrated in Figure 3. The IGM
module models the system event data as a heterogeneous in-
variant graph, which can capture the program’s behavior pro-
file. Then, we formulate the malicious program detection as
a heterogeneous graph matching problem and solve it with
HAGNE and SL.
Given two graphs G(1) = (V(1), E(1)) and G(2) =
(V(2), E(2)), HAGNE first generates corresponding graph
embeddings hG(1) and hG(2) in a hierarchical atten-
tional style and then fuses the two graph embeddings via
Similarity Learning (SL) and outputs a similarity score
Sim(G(1), G(2)). In this way, the representation of the graph
and similarity metric can be learned in a joint way, such that
the effective graph similarity matching can be performed.
During the malware detection stage, the distance between an
unknown program and an existing benign program will be
maximized in the mapped embedding space under the learned
similarity metric.
3.2 Invariant Graph Modeling
Information systems often generate a large volume of system-
event data (i.e., the interaction between a pair of system enti-
ties). In a typical enterprise environment, the amount of data
collected from a single computer system can easily reach one
gigabyte after monitoring process interactions for one hour.
Learning a representation over such massive data is pro-
hibitively expensive in terms of both time and space. Re-
cently, a very promising means for studying complex systems
has emerged through the concept of invariant graph [Cheng
et al., 2016; Luo et al., 2018]. Such invariant graph focuses
on discovering stable and significant dependencies between
pairs of entities that are monitored through surveillance data
recordings, so as to profile the system status and perform sub-
sequent reasoning.
Following the idea of the invariant graph, we model the
system event data as a heterogeneous graph between different
system entities (e.g., processes, files, and Internet sockets).
The edges indicate the causal dependencies including a pro-
cess accessing a file, a process forking another process, and
a process connecting to an Internet socket. Formally, given
the event data U across several machines within a time win-
dow (e.g., one day), each target program can be a heteroge-
neous graph G = (V,E), in which V denotes a set of nodes.
Each node represents an entity of three possible types: pro-
cess (P), file (F), and INETSocket (I), namely V = P ∪F ∪I .
E denotes a set of edges (dependencies) (vs, vd, r) between
the source entity vs and destination entity vd with relation
r. We consider three types of relations: (1) a process fork-
ing another process (P → P ), (2) a process accessing a file
(P → F ), and (3) a process connecting to an Internet socket
(P → I). Each graph is associated with an adjacency ma-
trix A. With the help of the invariant graph modeling, we can
obtain a global program-dependency profile.
3.3 Hierarchical Attentional Graph Neural
Encoder
The constructed invariant graph is heterogeneous with multi-
ple types of entities and relations. Thus, it is difficult to di-
rectly apply the traditional homogeneous Graph Neural Net-
works (such as GCN and GraphSage) to learn the graph rep-
resentation. To address this problem, we propose a Hierar-
chical Attentional Graph Neural Encoder (HAGNE) to learn
the program representation as a graph embedding through an
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4)
(B) Hierarchical Attentional Graph Neural Encoder (HAGNE)
Unknown Program
Known Benign Program
(A) IGM
(A) IGM
(B) HAGNE
(B) HAGNE
(C) SL
Figure 3: The architecture of MatchGNet consists of three key modules: (A) Invariant Graph Modeling (IGM), (B) Hierarchical Attentional
Graph Neural Encoder (HAGNE), and (C) Similarity Learning (SL). IGM models system event data as a heterogeneous invariant graph.
HAGNE encodes the heterogeneous graph into an embedding by four components: (B1) Heterogeneity-aware Contextual Search, (B2)
Node-wise Attentional Neural Aggregator, (B3) Layer-wise Dense-connected Neural Aggregator, and (B4) Path-wise Attentional Neural
Aggregator. SL trains HAGNE to be more distinguishable between an unknown program and known benign programs and computes the
similarity score for unknown malware detection.
attentional architecture by considering the node-wise, layer-
wise, and path-wise context importance. More specifically,
we first propose a Heterogeneity-aware Contextual Search
(Step (B1) in Figure 3) to find the path-relevant sets of neigh-
bors under the guide of the meta-paths [Sun et al., 2011].
Then, we introduce a Node-wise Attentional Neural Aggre-
gator (Step (B2) in Figure 3) to generate node embeddings
by selectively aggregating the entities in each path-relevant
neighbor set based on random walk scores. Next, we design
a Layer-wise Dense-connected Neural Aggregator (Step
(B3) in Figure 3) to aggregate the node embeddings generated
from different layers towards a dense-connected node embed-
ding. Finally, we develop a Path-wise Attentional Neural
Aggregator (Step (B4) in Figure 3) to learn the attentional
weights for different meta-paths and compute the graph em-
bedding from the Layer-wise Dense-connected Aggregator.
Heterogeneity-aware Contextual Search
As the first step of the aggregation layer, traditional GNNs
would search for all one-hop neighbors for a target node.
Since our invariant graph is heterogeneous, simply aggregat-
ing these neighbors cannot capture the semantic and struc-
tural correlations among different types of entities. To ad-
dress this issue, we propose a meta-path [Sun et al., 2011]
based contextual search. A meta-path is a path that con-
nects different entity types via a sequence of relations in a
heterogeneous graph. In a computer system, a meta-path
could be: a process forking another process (P → P ), two
processes accessing the same file (P ← F → P ), or two
processes opening the same internet socket (P ← I → P )
with each one defining a unique relationship between two
programs. From the invariant graph G, a set of meta-paths
M = {M1,M2, ...M|M|} can be generated with each rep-
resenting a unique multi-hop relationship between two pro-
grams. For each meta-path Mi where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., |M|}, we
define the path-relevant neighbor set N iv of node v:
N iv = {u|(u, v) ∈Mi, (v, u) ∈Mi} (1)
where u is a reachable neighbor of v via the meta-path Mi.
Node-wise Attentional Neural Aggregator
After constructing the path-relevant neighbor set N iv , we are
able to leverage these contexts via neighbourhood aggrega-
tion. However, due to noisy neighbors, different neighboring
nodes may have different impacts on the target node. Hence,
it is unreasonable to treat all neighbors equally. To address
this issue, we propose a node-wise attentional neural aggre-
gator to compute an attentional weight for each node in the
path-relevant neighbor set N iv . This module is based on ran-
dom walk with restarts (RWR) [Tong et al., 2006], a particu-
larly efficient algorithm for computing the relevance scores
between pairs of nodes in a homogeneous graph. We ex-
tend the RWR to a heterogeneous graph, such that the walker
starts at the target program node v, and at each step it only
moves to one of its neighboring nodes inN iv , instead of to all
linked nodes without considering semantics. After the ran-
dom walk finishes, each visited neighbor will receive a visit-
ing count. We compute the L1 normalization of the visiting
count and use it as the node-wise attentional weight. For-
mally, for N iv = {ui1, ..., uin}, the attentional weights are
αi(v)(:) = [α
i
(v)(1), ..., α
i
(v)(n)], where α
i
(v)(j) is the weight
of uij . Then, the program representation can be computed via
a neural aggregation function AGGnode by
h(i)(k)v = AGGnode(h
(i)(k−1)
v , {h(i)(k−1)u }u∈N iv )
= MLP (k)((1 + (k))h(i)(k−1)v +
∑
u∈N iv
αi(u)(:)h
(i)(k−1)
u )
(2)
where k ∈ {1, 2, ...K} denotes the index of the layer, h(i)(k)v
is the feature vector of program v for meta-path Mi at the k-
th layer, and (k) is a trainable parameter that quantifies the
trade-off between the previous layer representation and the
aggregated contextual representation. h(i)(0)u is initialized by
Xv . After getting the aggregated representation, a multi-layer
perceptron (MLP) is applied to transform the aggregated rep-
resentation to a hidden nonlinear space. Through the devel-
opment of Node-wise Attentional Neural Aggregator, we are
able to leverage the contextual information, meanwhile con-
sidering the different importance of the neighbors.
Layer-wise Dense-connected Neural Aggregator
To aggregate the information from a wider range of neigh-
bors, one simple way is to stack multiple node-wise neural
aggregators. However, the performance of a GNN model
often cannot get improved, because by adding more layers,
it is easy to propagate the noisy information from an ex-
ponentially increasing number of neighbors in a deep layer.
Recently, inspired by residual network, a skip-connection
method has been proposed. But, even with skip-connections,
GCNs with more layers do not perform as well as the 2-
layer GCN on many graph data [Kipf and Welling, 2016].
To address the limitations of existing work, we propose a
Layer-wise Dense-connected Aggregator as inspired by the
DENSENET [Huang et al., 2017]. More specifically, our
layer-wise aggregator leverages all the intermediate represen-
tations, with each capturing a subgraph structure. All the
intermediate representations are aggregated in a concatena-
tion way followed by a MLP, such that the resulted embed-
ding can adaptively select different subgraph structures. For-
mally, the Layer-wise Dense-connected Neural Aggregator
AGGlayer() can be constructed as follows:
h(i)(K+1)v = AGGlayer(h
(i)(0)
v ,h
(i)(1)
v , ...h
(i)(K)
v ) (3)
=MLP ([h(i)(0)v ;h
(i)(1)
v ; ...h
(i)(K)
v ]) (4)
where [·; ·] represents the feature concatenation operation.
Path-wise Attentional Neural Aggregator
After the node-wise and layer-wise aggregators, different em-
beddings corresponding to different meta-paths are gener-
ated. However, different meta-paths should not be treated
equally. For example, Ransomware is usually very active in
accessing files, but it barely forks another process or opens
an internet socket, while VPNFilter is generally very active
in opening the internet socket, but it barely accesses a file
or forks another process. Therefore, we need to treat dif-
ferent meta-paths differently. To address this issue, we pro-
pose a Path-wise Attentional Neural Aggregator to aggre-
gate the embeddings generated from different path-relevant
neighbor sets. Our path-wise aggregator can learn the atten-
tional weights for different meta-paths automatically. For-
mally, given the program embedding h(i)(K+1)v correspond-
ing to each meta-pathMi, we define the path-wise attentional
weight as follows:
βi =
exp(σ(b[Wbh
(i)(K+1)
v ||Wbh(j)(K+1)v ]))∑
j′∈|M| exp(σ(b[Wbh
(i)(K+1)
v ||Wbh(j
′)(K+1)
v ]))
(5)
where h(i)(K+1)v is the embedding corresponding to the tar-
get meta-path Mi, h
(j)(K+1)
v denotes the embedding corre-
sponding to the other meta-path Mj , b denotes a trainable at-
tention vector, Wb denotes a trainable weight matrix, which
maps the input features to the hidden space, || denotes the
concatenation operation, and σ denotes the nonlinear gating
function. We formulate a feed-forward neural network, which
computes the correlation between one path-relevant neighbor
set and other path-relevant neighbor sets. This correlation
is normalized by a Softmax function. Let ATT () represent
Eq.(5). The joint representation for all the meta-paths can be
represented as follows:
hG = AGGpath =
|M|∑
i=1
ATT (h(i)(K+1)v )h
(i)(K+1)
v (6)
The Path-wise Attentional Neural Aggregator allows us to
better infer the importance of different meta-paths by leverag-
ing their correlations and learn a path-aware representation.
3.4 Similarity Learning
In order to perform effective graph matching, we propose
Similarity Learning (SL), a Siamese Network based learn-
ing model to train the parameters of the Hierarchical Atten-
tional Graph Neural Encoder (HAGNE). Siamese Networks
[Zagoruyko and Komodakis, 2015] are neural networks con-
taining two or more identical subnetwork components, which
have been shown to be a powerful way in distinguishing sim-
ilar and dissimilar objects. Here, we employ the SL to learn
similarity metric and program graph representation jointly for
better graph matching between the pair of unknown program
and known benign program as shown in Figure 3.
More specifically, our Siamese Network consists of two
identical HAGNEs to compute the program graph represen-
tation independently. Each HAGNE takes a program graph
snapshot as the input and outputs the corresponding embed-
ding hG. A neural network is then used to fuse the two em-
beddings. The final output is the similarity score of the two
program embeddings. During the training, P pairs of pro-
gram graph snapshots (Gi(1), Gi(2)), i ∈ {1, 2, ...P} are col-
lected with corresponding ground truth pairing information
yi ∈ {+1,−1}. If the pair of graph snapshots belong to the
same program, the ground truth label is yi = +1, otherwise
its ground truth label is yi = −1. For each pair of program
snapshots, a cosine score function is used to measure the sim-
ilarity of the two program embeddings and the output of the
Similarity Learning is defined as follows:
Sim(Gi(1), Gi(2)) = cos((hGi(1) ,hGi(2))) (7)
=
hGi(1) · hGi(2)
||hGi(1) ||·||hGi(2) ||
(8)
Correspondingly, our objective function can be formulated as:
` =
P∑
i=1
(Sim(Gi(1), Gi(2))− yi)2 (9)
We optimize this objective with Adam optimizer [Kingma
and Ba, 2014]. With the help of the Similarity Learning, we
can learn the parameters that keep similar embeddings closer
while pushing dissimilar embeddings apart by directly opti-
mizing the embedding distance.
Since we directly optimize the distance between the two
programs, this model can be used to perform unknown mal-
ware detection. Given the snapshot of an unknown program,
we first construct its corresponding program invariant graph
and then feed it to the HAGNE to generate the program em-
bedding. After that, we compute the cosine distance scores
between the embedding of the unknown program and the ones
of the existing programs in the database. If an existing pro-
gram has more than one embedding generated from multiple
graph snapshots, we will only report the highest similarity
score with regard to the unknown program. Finally, we rank
all the similarity scores. If the highest similarity score among
all the existing programs is below our threshold, an alert will
be triggered. Otherwise, the top-k most similar programs will
be reported.
4 Experiments
4.1 Experiment Setup
Data
We collect a 20-week period of data from a real enterprise
network composed of 109 hosts (87 Windows hosts and 22
Linux hosts). The sheer size of the data set is around three
terabytes. We consider three different types of system events
as defined in Section 3.2. Each entity is associated with a
set of attributes, and each process has an executable name
as its identifier (ID). In total, there are about 300 million
event records, with about 2, 000 processes, 600, 000 files, and
18, 000 Internet sockets. Based on the system event data, we
construct a program invariant graph per program per day.
Baselines
We compare MatchGNet with the following typical and
state-of-the-art algorithms:
• LR and SVM: LR and SVM represent the Logistic re-
gression and Linear Support Vector Machine, respec-
tively. They are two typical classification methods. We
extract raw features from each process as the input, in-
cluding the connectivity features and the graph statistic
features.
• MLP [Pal and Mitra, 1992]: Multi-layer Perceptron
(MLP) is a deep neural network based classification
model with multiple non-linear layers between the input
and the output layers. It is a special case of GNN with-
out considering the aggregation operation if we define
the propagation layer as an identity matrix.
Since the proposed MatchGNet is based on GNN, we also
compare it with two popular GNN variants: GCN [Kipf and
Welling, 2016] and GraphSage [Hamilton et al., 2017].
Evaluation Metrics
Similar to [Das and Schneider, 2007], we evaluate the perfor-
mance of different methods using accuracy (ACC), F-1 score,
and AUC score.
4.2 Fake Program Detection
Our first research question focuses on the accuracy of
MatchGNet detecting fake programs. Here, we define a fake
program as the one that uses the ID of another program. It is
a common method for adversaries to hide their attacks.
To simulate the execution of fake programs on a large scale,
in our testing dataset (i.e., data from the seventh week), we
manually seed 1, 000 fake programs. To do so, before feeding
the monitoring data to MatchGNet, we randomly replace the
ID of a known program to the ID of another known program.
This process simulates an adversary who wants to hide the
use of a benign system tool in his/her attacks.
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Figure 4: ROC curves on detecting fake programs.
In this task, each fake program has a claimed ID of a known
program. Thus, we only need to check whether it is indeed
the claimed program: if it matches the behavior pattern of
Table 1: Performance on fake program detection.
Method SVM LR MLP GCN GraphSage MatchGNet
AUC 51.11 82.79 85.11 94.53 91.72 98.51
F-1 66.07 83.05 86.12 93.63 90.02 98.49
ACC 50.45 80.66 86.82 94.87 92.03 97.03
Table 2: Performance on unknown program detection.
Method SVM LR MLP GCN GraphSage MatchGNet
AUC 51.11 80.63 83.69 92.05 90.38 96.08
F-1 66.07 82.92 84.37 92.03 90.43 95.55
ACC 50.01 81.98 85.00 92.24 91.50 96.53
the claimed program, the predicted label should be −1; oth-
erwise, it should be +1. We use logistic regression as the
classification model for all the methods.
The ROC curve is shown in Figure 4. We also summa-
rize the AUC, F-1 score and ACC of the six models in Ta-
ble 1. From our experiments, the AUC of MatchGNet is
99%, which is at least 4% higher than all other baseline mod-
els. In terms of ACC, MatchGNet could achieve 47%, 16%,
10%, 2%, and 5% higher than the SVM, LR, MLP, GCN,
and GraphSage models. This means that while capturing all
the fake program instances, MatchGNet has less false pos-
itives than all other models. This result justifies our design
decision of applying the invariant graph structure and Graph
Neural Network model to capture the semantics of program
instances.
Hyper Parameter Selection
We evaluate the selection of hyper parameters of
MatchGNet with our validating data set (i.e., data from the
sixth week). There are two hyper parameters in MatchGNet:
the number of layers, and the number of hidden neurons. We
plot the result for the number of layers and the number of
hidden neurons in Figure 5. In these figures, the y-axis is the
AUC value and the x-axis is the value of the hyper parameter.
(a) AUC vs. the number of lay-
ers.
(b) AUC vs. the number of hid-
den neurons.
Figure 5: Hyper parameters in fake program detection.
We find that when MatchGNet has 3 layers and 500 neu-
rons, it reaches the maximal AUC. Larger hyper-parameter
values may consume more resources but have little improve-
ment on the AUC. Thus, we use the optimal hyper parameters
as a part of the default model and apply them to the other parts
of our experiments.
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Figure 6: ROC curves on detecting unknown programs.
4.3 Unknown Program Detection
This experiment focuses on evaluating MatchGNet on un-
known program detection. To simulate unknown program
instances, we split the programs in the training data equally
into two sets, the known set and the unknown set. In our
five weeks’ training data, we exclude the programs in the un-
known set and only train the model from the programs in the
known set. Then, in our testing period, we use program in-
stances from the unknown set as malicious programs.
We plot the ROC curves in Figure 6 and report the AUC,
F-1 score, and ACC of all six models in Table 2. The AUC
of MatchGNet in detecting unknown program instances is
at least 4% higher than all other models. And in terms of
ACC, MatchGNet is 46%, 14%, 11%, 4%, and 5% higher
than the SVM, LR, MLP, GCN, and GraphSage models. This
also proves that using the Attentional Graph Neural Network
model could better capture the semantic level features of pro-
grams and may possibly generate less false positives.
4.4 Malware Attack Detection
To evaluate the usefulness of MatchGNet, we apply it to
detect realistic malware attacks in enterprise environment.
We randomly download 145 malware from VirusTotal cov-
ering all the popular malware categories and create 9 realis-
tic attack cases from the literature and report including Wan-
naCry, Genasom, Sorikrypt, Shinolocker, Puishing Email,
ShellShock, Netcat Backdoor, Passing the Hash, and Trojan
Attacks.
We execute these attacks on our two testing machines and
merge the provenance data from these two testing machines
with the normal data of the 109 hosts to the data stream of
MatchGNet. We set up MatchGNet with the optimal hyper
parameters in Section 4.2.
To evaluate the usefulness of MatchGNet, we use the
state-of-the-art entity-embedding based technique [Chen et
al., 2016] as the baseline.
Based on the experimental results, both MatchGNet and
the baseline method capture all the 154 true alerts. However,
during the same time period and with the same provenance
data, MatchGNet only generates 57 false positives while the
baseline generates 115 false positives. Such a number indi-
cates that MatchGNet is possible to reduce nearly 50% of
the false positives. This reduction could mean a substantial
saving in cyber-analysts’ time in a large enterprise.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed MatchGNet, a heteroge-
neous Graph Matching Network approach to detect the
unknown malicious programs in information systems.
MatchGNet first models the program’s execution behavior
as a heterogeneous invariant graph. Based on the built pro-
gram graphs, it learns the graph representation and similarity
metric simultaneously to distinguish the benign program and
malware. The evaluation results showed that our approach
can accurately detect unexpected program instances. In par-
ticular, it can detect fake and unknown programs with an av-
erage accuracy of 97% and 96%, respectively. We further
demonstrate our approach is promising by having 50% less
false positives than the state-of-the-art method in detecting
malware attacks.
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